India has observed 9% growth in all-round development of infrastructure during the last Five-Year Plan of [2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012]. The backbone of all such developments lies with power infrastructure where thermal power plants (TPP) are the major (65.99%) contributor. However, being located at remote geographic locations TPPs are vulnerable to security hazards when the country's 252 (39.38%) districts are afflicted by the varying intensity of terrorism. Security system models until date are limited to commercial and urban infrastructure sector, which differ significantly in terms of forms and functions than power plants or other heavy industries. Hence, development of security strategies relevant to TPPs needs an urgent attention. This research was successful in investigating the most significant hazards for TPPs and identifying the relevant security system contributing towards mitigation of such hazards. Literature review yielded a set of 9 hazards, 5 security systems with more than 40 subsystems and 7 major components of a typical TPP. Pilot survey and case study was conducted to ascertain hazards and systems relevant for a TPP followed by face-to-face questionnaire survey at 2600 MW Korba Super Thermal Power Station of NTPC (National Thermal Power Corporation) Limited. In a 5-point-Likert scale, 51 security offices or personnel graded the relevance and importance of the hazards and systems for each of the seven TPP components. Statistical analysis of the obtained data showed fire as the most significant hazard followed by explosion. For the security systems, fire protection system was the most critical one followed by architectural-civil system and access control system. Knowledge elicited from this study can be compared with smaller or differently owned TPPs to find generic appropriateness of these results. Further, it will help in priority setting of security management strategies of TPPs.
INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures , which include public buildings, transportation systems, power plants, water supply systems, communication networks, manufacturing facilities, healthcare etc. which if sabotaged or attacked, will have a devastating effect on a nation's security, economy, public health or safety (DHS, 2007) . In the present times, these public facilities, indispensable for operation of many aspects of modern society, run under a high threat of terrorism (Coaffee et al., 2008) . Terrorism may be described as a systematic use of violence for the purpose of achieving a political objective (Pizam, & Smith, 2000) Especially after the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001 critical infrastructures have been placed at the focal point of security management throughout the world (Brömmelhörster et al., 2004) .
India, as lately in 2012, suffers from various internally and externally caused terrorist activities cumulatively engulfing 252 of the 640 (39.38%) administrative districts of the country. Mumbai attacks in November 2008 are considered India's 9/11 as they exposed the serious shortfalls in India's security apparatus (SATP, 2013) . Indian Government having envisaged increasing investment in infrastructure from INR 20.5 trillion to INR 40.9 trillion (>10% Gross Domestic Product growth rate) by 2017 in the 12 th 5-year plan period (EYPL, 2012) , physical security beyond information based security system for public infrastructure is of vital importance. As power being inevitable in functioning of most of the critical infrastructure, power plants can be considered as the backbone of economy and development.
According to International Energy Agency (IEA) report 2013, thermal power plants (TPP)
will contribute to about 85% of global electricity production by 2030. In India, TPPs located in remote locations often in disturbed areas, deserve foremost attention in terms of security currently accounting for 65.99% of the electricity generation. With security aspect of the TPPs in India, as the focus of this research, the aim was to identify the security parameters for plants, which in turn will contribute towards a sound security management strategy.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been a global change in the perspective of security from emergency planning to preventive measures, ushered consecutively to the terrorist attack on United States on September 11, 2001 (Coaffee et al, 2008) . A three-dimensional study approach of literature was employed in order to understand this perspective of prevention in the case of TPPs:
• General hazards in event of terrorist attack
• Security systems mitigating such hazards
• Broadly classified TPP components and their functions
General Hazards in event of Terrorist Attack
A range of preventative and coping design strategies to reduce the probability of external attack should be employed, as terrorists focus on soft unsecured targets (Then, & Loosemore, 2006) . A thorough analysis of literature yielded the following hazards, namely: explosion, fire, unauthorized intrusion, vehicular attack, ballistic attack, structural failure, flying debris, gas and liquid spillage and bio-weapons.
Security Systems against Terrorist Attack
Building systems contributing to the security strategies effective in mitigating one or more hazards as shown in Table 1 (RIBA, 2010; So, & Chan, 2009; Janus & Blewett 2004) .
These security systems with more than 40 subsystems are applicable to all built-forms.
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Major TPP Components and Their Functions
Broadly, classified seven vital sections or components of a TPP in general are discussed in the following section (Chaplin, 2009; HCL Infosystems Ltd., 2012; Klein, 2009 ). For convenience, they are assigned with numbers 1 to 7 (Table 2) . General discussion on security systems is not adequate for TPPs as review of the functioning of major TPP components, made apparent that many systems contributing towards security of general infrastructure are not applicable to TPP. In addition, applicability of any security system changes for a general building and for a TPP complex with complicated automatic electrical/mechanical units. Till date very little research has been done on security system of TPP. In order to bridge this knowledge gap, this research was undertaken.
THE STUDY
In order to identify the security parameters for plants contributing towards a sound security management strategy, it was assumed that these parameters can be derived from security systems only, which are relevant to TPP.
Case Study and Questionnaire Design
The case study was conducted at the 2600 MW Super Thermal Power Plant of Korba, Chhattisgarh owned by National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) of India. With its seven units developed over the 1983 to 2010, it is one of the largest TPPs of the country with high-end facilities and considerable employee strength (NTPC, 2009).
Only the executives and personnel directly responsible for security of the plants were included in the target population for the questionnaire survey. First the pilot survey was conducted to ascertain comprehensiveness of the designed questionnaire. Final surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews of selected respondents using a structured questionnaire consisting of the following three parts:
• Part 1: Respondents' details to obtain their profile, like age, gender, designation,
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Engineering, Project, and Production Management (EPPM 2013) experience, etc.
• Part 2: Their perception on hazards relevant and critical for TPP components.
• Part 3: Security systems relevant and critical for TPP components. The perceptions of the respondents were measured using, a 5-point Likert scale for probability of occurrence of hazards and level of importance of systems (Table 3 ). The Likert scale being an ordinal scale can be employed to generate hierarchies of preferences allowing comparisons across groups of respondents as per the sampling frame (Fellows, & Liu, 2003) . 
Method of Data Analysis
The IBM SPSS Statistics 20.0 software was employed for statistical analysis of the weight for criticality of hazards and relevance of security systems given by the respondents.
Weighted mean scores of the hazards and security systems were calculated using Eqn. 1 (Ekanayake, & Ofori, 2004) .
Where n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , n 5 represent the total number of responses for hazards and systems as 1 to 5 respectively.
The obtained data was subjected to single sample t-test to determine the level of significance of each of the hazards as well as security systems. Hypothesized population mean was taken as midpoint of the grading scale i.e. 3. Considering 95% confidence level, relevant critical t-value was obtained from standard table. If the sample mean had p<0.05 and t-value > critical t-value, the corresponding hazard or security system was considered significant.
Critical t-value was calculated with degree of freedom equal to 1 less than the sample size.
Based on the obtained t-values, the significant hazards and security systems were ranked in terms of their mean values in each of the TPP component. The hazards and security systems of a TPP component, having the highest significant mean value were ranked as '1', as having
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RESULTS
Photo documentation being strictly prohibited, expert walk-through supervised by the plant's security personnel was conducted during the case study. The personnel commented on general security norms being followed in the plant but did not disclose the precise details.
HVAC system is limited to the administrative building and bio-safety system being by and large un-heard off is absent. Manually operated metal detectors and CCTV monitored entry check points are part of the security surveillance system. Perimeter is guarded by 10-12 feet high boundary walls mounted with 4 feet double concertina barbed wire fencing and watch towers located at unobstructed visible distance. Water hydrants are present around the components and buildings of the plant for fire protection.
Out of 60 questionnaires circulated, 55 were received back but only 51 were complete.
The sample size of 51 fulfilled the requirement of minimum sample size for a statistically sound analysis (Tan, 2008) . Out of 51 respondents, 56.86% have relevant experience in TPP of 10-15 years and majority of the respondents (88.24%) was found to have security management training.
Results of the Statistical Analysis
The results are presented in Table 4 and 5 respectively. Rank of hazards and systems for each of the TPP components are shown as superscript value for the significant quantities. Note. Superscript numbers are rank of significant hazards for one particular TPP component and have t-value > critical t-value of 1.6759.
The Critical Hazards
Statistical analysis showed that fire is the most significant hazard, having the highest significant mean score five of the seven TPP components. In boiler and transformer & distribution infrastructure explosion ranked highest with significant mean values and fire came at second position. Explosion ranks second in three of the seven components namely:
(1) entry/exit points & parking area (2) 
The Critical Security Systems
The respondents deemed fire protection system to contribute most critically towards plant security, in five of the seven components of the plant. However, fire protection system holds the third rank in entry/exit points & parking area and cooling tower & electrostatic precipitator. Access control system and architectural−civil system both seem to be highest-ranking system in entry -exit points & parking area and cooling tower & electrostatic precipitator respectively. In all of the components of a TPP except one architectural−civil system ranks second. Access control system too scores a second position in all components but cooling tower & electrostatic precipitator. Access control system remains the overall third most critical system of security in a TPP.
DISCUSSION
Vulnerability of critical systems is not uniform across all hazards and threats (Baker et al, 2003) . In line with this, it was observed that for different TPP components, criticality of
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Implementation of fire protection system for prevention, cessation and mitigation of fire and related hazards is emphasized to be done at a more up-to-date and robust level as the fire protection system has a major role in (1) Except for cooling tower & electrostatic precipitator, architectural -civil system ranks second in all of the components of a TPP. Hence for TPPs, it can be conclusively stated that the functional parts are more important than the envelope that provides protection to them.
The highest-ranking system in entry / exit points & parking area with unauthorized-intrusion as one the critical hazard and cooling tower & electrostatic precipitator were the access control system and architectural−civil system respectively. Hence, general discussion on security systems is not adequate for TPPs is thus reinforced by this study. Rather it is advisable to use the significant security systems and subsystems as security parameters for strategic security management of TPPs. As per their rank, preference for design, installation or management security system can be employed.
CONCLUSION
Though the architectural−civil security system being the prima-facie of security system in the urban sector as indicated by previous research, security requirement for industrial infrastructure was found to be very different. Deeply probing into security issues, these study is first of its kind especially in India in terms of identifying and quantifying the security parameters for the security management of TPPs. Statistical analysis of obtained data from case studies and face-to-face questionnaire survey, checked the relevance and criticality of nine common hazards and five major security systems, and revealed that fire hazard and fire protection system are the most critical hazard and system respectively. This insight will help to improve the present knowledge base in relation to hazards and applicability of security systems in TPPs. Findings can be further refined by assessing the subsystems. Developing grading tool for security system of TPPs with the knowledge elicited from this study may help the strategy makers to take decision in selecting security strategies, devices or guidelines without installing costly equipments with complex and expensive technology. Furthermore, security requirements of other types of power plants as well as other form of critical infrastructure may be studied by employing this generic methodology.
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